What's a Star Shortstop Worth?

Carlos Correa is a really good baseball player. If you needed more proof of this fact, Correa provided it in the top of the 9th inning on Tuesday in Anaheim. Correa drilled a pitch from Angels closer Raisel Iglesias at 108.6 MPH for a game winning two-run homer.  

After the game, Correa said “I like hitting...when the game is on the line. That’s when I feel sexy.”  I also feel sexy when Correa hits late in the game. 

Correa celebrates his game winning homer.

Correa’s late game heroics brings up an important question--how much is a star shortstop worth?

In New York, a star shortstop is worth $34.1 million a year for 10 years. In San Diego, a star shortstop is worth $31.6 million over the 10 years their shortstop is eligible for free agency.

In Houston, it’s different. Correa is eligible for free agency after this season. The front office did approach Correa with contract extension offers during Spring Training, first offering him $20 million a year for six years. In a press conference, Correa described this offer as ““really low,” and said “I’m preparing like I’m going to be a free agent this year.” 

A week later, Correa said the Astros responded to his rejection of their first offer with a new offer of $25 million for five years.  Correa also said the Astros “made it clear to me they don’t believe in long contracts.”  

There are big difference between the two sides in this negotiation. Correa looks Tatis and Lindor and sees himself as their contemporary, and that he should be paid in a similar light to what they will paid over the next decade.

Correa is a brash and confidence baseball player, but his analysis of himself is entirely correct here.

In a piece on the Houston Chronicle's website, Tyler Stafford writes that “If you average out WAR over 162 games to simulate a full season, Correa has been the best shortstop in baseball since 2015, and it’s not particularly close.” Stafford helpfully provides the chart below to prove his point.

Stafford goes even further, finding that "when he is on the field, Correa is one of the best players in all of baseball full stop." And again, Stafford bring out the big tables, showing that Correa trails only Mike Trout and Mookie Betts in "WAR per 162 games" since 2015.

From a standpoint of on the field production, this seems like an open and shut case. Correa is a star level player and he should be paid like a star. Correa has produced only 1.0 bWAR less than Lindor, and despite Lindor having played in 175 more games than Correa (they debuted within 6 days of each other and each has been his team's first choice shortstop ever since). Correa's injury track record means there is more uncertainty about his future than Lindor's, so discount his contract from Lindor's to the appropriate amount and call the press conference. 

But that has not been the strategy of the Astros front office. As noted, they have offered Correa contract that are substantially shorter that those signed by Lindor and Tatis, and for less money each year. 

The fact that Astros are offering Correa contracts that are worth substantially less than his contemporaries at shortstop leads to two conclusions

1. The Astros do not value Carlos Correa as a star shortstop.
2. The Astros, as Correa said, "they don’t believe in long contracts."

An offer of $20 million a year for 6 years to player of Correa's caliber is an offer designed to be rejected by the player, but to allow the team to say to fans that they tried to keep the player. It is hard to believe the Astros expected Correa's representatives to either accept their offer or see it as a first step in serious negotiations. The Astros front office does not think he is worth the theoretical contact that he would agree to, and the contract he is likely to receive this off-season. 

Influencing this thinking is Correa's biggest weakness--his inability to stay healthy. Correa has played in only 610 of the 818 games the Astros have played since his June 8, 2015 debut. Correa missed substantial time on the IL in 2017, 2018, and 2019. He played all of 2020, but that season was limited to 60 games by the coronavirus pandemic. 

Concerns that Correa will continue to spend significant amounts of time on the IL undoubtedly played an important role in the front office's choice to make that "really low" offer to Correa.  But Correa's value when he has been on the field is substantial, and there is every reason to believe that even if he spends 30-40 games on the IL each season, he will match the value of the Lindor contract with an uncertainty discount. Fangraphs says that Correa has been worth $157.2 million in value so far in just over 5 full seasons of games since his debut. That's worth $31.1 million per season. 

The second conclusion must therefore hold more weight. The Astros "don't believe in long contracts."  Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Astros have given out a "long contract." The 6 year contract offer is the longest the franchise has offered to any player since Jim Crane became the owner. 

Jose Altuve and Alex Bregman both signed 5-year extensions with the club (though Altuve's was signed two years before his previous contract expired). Justin Verlander signed a "big contract" with the Astros, which pays him $33 million per year. But it is only for 2 years, and will expire at the end of this season. 

The lack of long contract seems to represent an organizational philosophy, and one that seems to held by both of Jim Crane's general managers. The front office was able to leverage the years that Bregman and Altuve had before their current contracts allowed them to enter free agency to sign deals  that satisfied the front office's preferences. on contract lengths.  Correa, who will be on the open market in November, has more leverage to get the long-term deal he wants. 

There are clear benefits to the strategy of the Astros front office. Long term deals can blow up in a team's face, especially as players gets further and further from his peak years.  Correa will turn 27 in late September, so he's in his prime now, but will not be in the later years of his contract. The front office has more financial flexibility to pursue a larger number of free agents, a strategy that may be needed more with the farm system low in the rankings right now, and less likely to produce quality major leaguers in the next few years.

But there are also drawbacks to this strategy. For example, instead of Carlos Correa playing shortstop, next year it will be a more cost-effective shortstop batting in the late innings in Anaheim.  That player will probably be less talented than Correa, and less likely to hit that go-ahead homer.  Star players are expensive when they reach free agency.  To have star level players on your team beyond their team controlled years, a team must pay them like a star level player. The advantage of doing so is that you get star level production from the best players in baseball. 

Jim Crane and James Click have made their choice about whether they want to pay the going rate for a star level shortstop.  It certainly is a choice.